need to dread. For this is to obscure the very fountain-light of our being, to cherish "the lie in the soul," as Plato puts it, which destroys and corrupts the entire character.

J. E. CREIGHTON.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

RELIGION AND THE PSYCHICAL LIFE.*

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES.

AS human life becomes complex, it is specialized into many social organizations and activities. The homogeneity of primitive society differentiates into numberless classes, parties, associations, and alliances. Law, art, science, and religion, in the early stages of society, are scarcely distinguishable from each other. In advanced civilizations they often appear separate and sometimes antagonistic. Not only do they seem to diverge from each other, but they tend to lose connection with the stream of concrete activity which produced them. Each specialized interest in turn develops parties and schools of thought within itself which threaten its unity. Obviously this is true of religion, and the case is not greatly different in law, art, and science. Such parties and their doctrines develop around partial, special interests, and finally become remote, abstract, and rent by internal conflict. Some Protestant sects have as their distinguishing mark a doctrine of the ordinances or the observance of a certain day of worship! It is possible, however, to put these varying developments within their proper genetic perspective, where their divergence may be understood and their ultimate source in vital processes

* A chapter from a work soon to be published under the title, "The Psychology of Religious Experience."

be made clear. Religion, with its changing forms, may thus be seen in its natural, concrete character as a phase of all socialized human experience. None of its manifestations remains the unmodified embodiment of all the spiritual values of this growing experience. Both apologists and critics of religion have neglected this fact. They have been misled by the persistent and pernicious fallacy which identifies a part with the whole, or a stage of development with the whole process. If one starts with the assumption that religion is synonymous with animism, then in a scientific age religion becomes remote from life and is destined to perish. Or if by religion is meant the development of the Hebrew tradition, it is a foregone conclusion that there is no religion among native Africans and Australians.

The results of genetic social psychology make it possible to overcome the various partial and limited conceptions of the relation of religion and life. Since the religious consciousness, according to these results, is just the consciousness of the greatest interests and purposes of life, in their most idealized and intensified forms, it is evident that in its generic nature religion is a most intimate aspect of human life. This may be shown in detail with reference to ceremonies, mythology, sacrifice, and prayer in primitive cults. Everywhere the sacred objects and functions are those in which the life of society is felt to center. But different stages in social development estimate these things differently and express social valuations in different ways. When all phases of life are permeated by superstition and magic, religion shares in this confused, childish attitude. But when custom has been criticized and given moral character through reflection and self-direction, religion may center in moral ideals and in rational methods of control. In early society, religion is more likely to remain identified with older customs, but even there the different phases of social life interact. Economic conditions compel reconstruction in traditional customs and often produce an

advance in morals which finally registers itself in religious symbols. Or, again, a prophetic religion may gain moral insight through its leaders, in advance of the masses, and thereby become an effective moralizing agency. In some instances the religion of one people has been taken to other races, and has presented sharp contrasts to the existing cults. Religion, in such a case, may become the occasion of social reconstruction and moral progress; but such an aggressive religion always requires an interpretation in terms of the historic social life of its origin. It is necessary to achieve an imaginative reproduction of the actual life of the society in which a religion arose, in order to make it effective in a new environment. Christianity undoubtedly presented high moral ideals and great ethical energy to the perishing civilizations of Greece and Rome. But it was not Christianity alone. The whole idealized social history of the Hebrew people, through its own literature, was carried over to the Gentiles. The task of infusing the history and concrete life of this people with warmth and color for the nations of Europe has been the great task of generations of Christian scholars, orators, and artists. At the same time, the growing life of the peoples which accepted Christianity has necessitated modifications in that religion. The culture of the Renaissance demanded, and the democracy and science of the present time demand, great readjustments in the prevailing religious institutions. The moralization of religion moves forward with the practical and ethical developments of the race. This is becoming clearer as the processes of social evolution are better understood. New ethical problems constantly arise in modern life with the emergence of new commercial and industrial activities. For example, the new methods and forms of the organization in industry represented by the corporation and the labor union, necessitate a new meaning for the term justice. This sense of new social relations is demanding recognition in new developments of religious activity and doc-

trine. Along with these claims for specific modifications, there is also a growing insistence upon the underlying principle of evolution. The age of invention and discovery has destroyed the old static life. With the wider knowledge of nature which science affords, the doctrine of development is passing into practical terms and taking the form of an ideal of individual and social progress.[1] A consequent readjustment of religion is recognized as necessary in order to enable it to embody the spirit of the new life which society is attaining. This readjustment is demanded, not in this or that particular, but as a continuous, thorough-going process to be conscientiously facilitated and maintained. The age begins to regard experimentation and progress as moral demands in every sphere of activity, and is therefore attaching religious significance to them. The movement is under way which is destined to exalt the very process of development to the place of a religious obligation. It may even add the attribute of evolution to the character of the Deity and embody the quality of dynamic, purposeful activity among the cardinal virtues. If the organized, institutionalized forms of religion appear barren and powerless, it is likely that a more real and vital religious consciousness will be found in other social movements, which are not yet designated as religious and may not even regard themselves as such. These conventionalized, lifeless forms arrogate to themselves the name of religion, and thereby succeed in creating the illusion that religion itself is inert and decadent. It is this fact which lends the color of truth to the statement that religion is characteristically conservative, and naturally follows rather than leads civilization's pioneers. This has come to be a common view among a certain school of social theorists. An almost equally extreme view on the opposite side is that which attributes social progress too largely to re-

[1] The tendency is expressed in many recent works such as Rauschenbusch, "Christianity and the Social Crisis;" Francis G. Peabody, "Jesus Christ and the Social Question."

ligious initiative, ignoring the complex economic, social influences which are operative. A truer view is this, that the ideal values of each age and of each type of social development tend to reach an intensity, a volume, and a symbolic expression which is religious. There is accordingly a conflict among religious as among all other types of social experience. If the religious struggles are the most tragic, it is because all parties are here contending for what seem to them the most profoundly important interests of life. Such struggles are finally settled, not by argument or war, but by the onward movement of the whole social development of mankind. Professor Ross has contrasted the religious aspects of this movement in terms of "legal religion" and "social religion." The former belongs, in his view, to the patriarchal type of society, the latter to that type of society in which sympathy and brotherhood prevail. He recognizes that religion persists in new forms with changing intellectual and social interests:

"Geology, or higher criticism, or comparative mythology, may undermine particular beliefs with which ethical-religious feeling has associated itself. But the soul of religion has a marvelous and little-suspected power of escaping into new forms of belief." "In western society, the beliefs that create legal religion are perishing before our eyes. They stand in flat contradiction to our knowledge, and as the state becomes more able to secure civil order, the social ego takes less pains to keep them alive for the sake of their usefulness. The idealism that creates social religion, however, is not suffering so much. . . . Social religion then has a long and possibly a great career awaiting it. As it disengages itself from that which is transient and perishable, as the dross is purged away from its beliefs and the element of social compulsion entirely disappears from it, social religion will become purer and nobler. No longer a paid ally of the policeman, no longer a pillar of social order, it will take its unquestioned place with art and science and wisdom, as one of the free manifestations of the higher human spirit." [2]

This concrete, essential relation of religion and life is evidenced also in a psychological analysis of ideals. Psychologically, ideals are more or less remote ends of

[2] "Social Control," pp. 213, 216.

action, whose realization is sought through the mediation of reflection and effort. The term moral has been used to designate those ideals which pertain particularly to human social welfare, in distinction from the claims of religion, which seeks authority for action and conduct in the will of a Deity. This contrast between moral and religious conduct belongs to that conception of the world which makes a rigid distinction between the natural and supernatural, between the human and divine. But if religion is identified with the most intimate and vital phases of the social consciousness, then the distinction between morality and religion is not real. That which makes an end or ideal of action moral is the fact that it is accepted with awareness; that it is compared with other ends; that it is analyzed; and that it is voluntarily chosen as good. This means that the social significance of the end desired is taken into account. All truly human conduct is necessarily social because its means and ends, its source and its consequences, are socially conditioned. Just because man's mind is a social reality, his moral or reflective ideals are also social. It is true that many social ends, both among primitive and civilized peoples, are not moral. They have not been reflectively selected; but all moral conduct is by necessity social. It follows that some forms of early religious consciousness may be lacking in moral quality, but that no genuinely moral consciousness can be without religious quality. In so far as religion is non-moral, it is primitive and controlled by custom. On the other hand, all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great, vital interests of society. Religion, in the minds of its best representatives at the present time, consciously and frankly accepts as its highest conception the ideal of a kingdom or brotherhood of moral agents, coöperating for the attainment of further moral ends. A representative theologian gives the following statement as the central doctrine of Christianity: "Jesus was wholly concerned with ethics, with begetting and fostering in

men the Godlike life. The word 'character' summarizes the great interest and life-purpose of Jesus Christ."[3] Professor Coe, after giving a psychological statement of the nature of ideals, says: "It should be noted also that there is no break between morals and religion as we here conceive them. Both move within the sphere of the good. The race becomes religious just where it becomes moral, namely, wherever our uncouth ancestors took a step beyond instinct by defining some object as their good and forming corresponding ideals."[4] The attempt to delimit the field of natural morality from religion presupposes, in the older writers, a dualism between human and divine, natural and 'regenerated' natures. Without the definite assumption of this dualism the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely.[5]

When one turns from the theologians and theorists to the concrete experience of religious people, the presence and importance of the moral ideal as the core of religion is still more evident. One result of Starbuck's investigation gives striking confirmation to this point. His subjects were representative of average orthodox evangelical church members. They insisted that the most constant and persistent element in their religious consciousness was the moral ideal.

"In adolescence," writes Starbuck, "when the new life bursts forth, its most important content was ethical. During storm and stress and doubt, that which remained firmest when life was least organized was this same instinct. And now we find, in describing their fundamental attitudes toward life, that the respondents already in the late teens and twenties mention conduct almost as frequently as at any later time in life. . . . It should be recalled that among the things which are given as absolutely essen-

[3] Stevens, "Doctrine of Salvation," p. 475.

[4] "Moral and Religious Education from the Psychological Point of View," *The Journal of Religious Education*, Vol. III, December, 1908.

[5] Palmer, "The Field of Ethics," Chap. IV. The attempt in this chapter to show what religion adds to morality issues in the claim that it adds "horizon, stability, and hope!" But are not these qualities afforded to some degree by every ideal?

tial, the *sine qua non* of religion, conduct was most frequently mentioned.'' [6] The respondents say: ''The test of religion is conduct towards my fellow-beings.'' ''Religion is more a *life*, a living, than a system. It is a series of daily actions which determines conduct. Its essence is the daily doing of good to one's fellow-men.''

This conscious recognition of moral conduct as the deepest thing in their religious experience, is all the more impressive when it is taken in connection with the fact that much of their training in religion must have emphasized the customary doctrine that mere morality has nothing in common with religion. Theoretically, the popular presentation of religion moves largely within sacramentarian conceptions. The saving power of ordinances survives in practice even when the doctrine has been silenced. It is the usual keynote of evangelistic appeals that the good works one does in his natural state are of themselves of no avail. It is necessary to 'surrender,' 'obey,' 'confess' and receive a 'spirit,' in order to become genuinely religious. Of course, all such expressions may be given a justifiable and reasonable moral content, but in religious usage they ordinarily mean that in this way a new life, which was foreign before, comes into one's experience. Thenceforth it gives efficacy to good resolutions and good deeds. But in spite of the prevalence of such teaching, the investigation referred to above shows that ''during storm and stress and doubt'' that which remained firm was the natural ethical character; and it was this moral life which afterwards constituted the substance of religion.

The comparison of this moral and social religious ideal with the medieval notion of saintliness is thus described by Professor James:

''The Catholicism of the sixteenth century paid little heed to social righteousness; and to leave the world to the devil whilst saving one's own soul was then accounted no discreditable scheme. To-day, rightly or wrongly, helpfulness in general human affairs is, in consequence of one of those secu-

[6] ''Psychology of Religion,'' p. 321.

lar mutations in moral sentiment of which I spoke, deemed an essential element of worth in character; and to be of some public or private use is also reckoned as a species of divine service.'' [7]

The clear apprehension of the concrete relation of religion to the total life process furnishes a corrective for the erroneous view that, within the individual, religion is due to some unique faculty or instinct. The extreme form of the faculty theory of psychology arose historically with individualism, while individualism in turn accompanied the differentiation of the old social unity into various activities. As Professor Dewey says:

''This extreme individualistic tendency was contemporaneous with a transfer of interest from the supernatural church-state over to commercial, social, and political bodies with which the modern man found himself identified. . . . The individualistic tendency found a convenient intellectual tool in a psychology which resolved the individual into an association or series of particular states of feeling and sensations; and the good into a like collection of pleasures also regarded as particular mental states.'' [8]

The psychologists of that period, whether of the associationist or intuitionist type, viewed the mental life as separated into discrete elements and processes. Reason, feeling, and volition were distinct from each other. The rational nature, the moral nature, the religious nature were taken as having their own psychological mechanisms. The activity and development of these endowments identified the individual with the corresponding human interests. The operations of reason made him rational, those of the moral nature made him moral, and those of the religious nature made him religious. But modern life is revealing, not merely the harmony of its various departments in working alliance, but their vital and organic relations with each other in purposive life history. In the same way, the various phases of human nature are found to be more than attributes or qualities inhering in man's metaphysical being. They are different aspects, stages, or abstracted processes of the total, pulsating life of the

[7] ''Varieties of Religious Experience,'' p. 354.

[8] Dewey and Tufts, ''Ethics,'' pp. 220, 221.

organism. The normal mental life is a complex, functionally organized activity. Like other high biological organisms, man is capable of doing a variety of things and of gaining a wealth of experience in the process, but there is but one mental life involved. The various interests which he pursues—business, art, science, politics, religion—employ his whole nature. Their differences are those of direction, of emphasis, of methods. This functional specialization of activity creates appropriate systems of habits and attitudes, and these systems may be called different 'selves,' but the differences between such selves are only relative and provisional. Religion in this view, like all other interests, is a matter of habits and attitudes. The religious nature is not something distinguishable and separable in any mechanical and exclusive way. Such a 'nature' is just one of the selves in a functional and relative sense. It has no more independence or uniqueness than one's artistic nature or one's scientific nature. Religion, like every other specialized interest of man, involves the reaction of his entire nature. It is not the product of any one agency within him. In its most natural, normal development, it is just the expression and appreciation of those ideal relationships and values which are inherent in all earnest moral effort.

These considerations concerning the naturalness of religion have suggestive application to particular phases of religious experience. Recent studies have undertaken to describe and classify various phenomena, such as faith, prayer, worship, and mysticism.[9] There is usually a tendency to limit these terms in a way which betrays a failure to relate them with sufficient concreteness and complexity to the total activity of the religious consciousness. The fallacies of taking religion apart from life and of mistaking some partial factor for the whole, reappear in the treatment of special topics.

---

[9] *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education,* Clark University Press.

Faith is very commonly viewed in this way. It is regarded as peculiar to religion and as due to some special endowment or experience. Faith is called the instrument of religion, and knowledge the instrument of science. But in reality religion and science both involve the whole mental life, emotion, imagination, reason, and action. They are differentiated by their center of interest within the total life history of human action. Science, religion, art, and other interests are distinguished simply by emphasis upon different aspects of human purposive action. They therefore harmonize with each other while maintaining relatively definite characters of their own. The phenomena of faith at once appear simple and clear, when viewed with reference to the moving circuit characteristic of all purposive activity. It is the piecemeal and unarticulated view, which makes faith the occasion of so many problems and mysteries. It is not to be supposed that all difficulties of interpretation disappear when these phenomena are approached with the methods and presuppositions of functional psychology. But it is nevertheless true that many difficulties are at once resolved or eliminated.

When faith is examined psychologically and compared with similar phenomena in other than religious experiences, it is found to correspond with the purposive factor in activity. It may be said that wherever there is an ideal of any kind, there is faith. This is clear and obvious in so far as ideals are conceived dynamically. An ideal as an end of action,—that is, as something desired, something for whose realization means are intelligently sought, and something toward whose attainment effort is confidently put forth,—involves faith. For faith is just that interest, confidence, and vivid envisagement which makes the ends sought so vital and appealing. Faith is a vital working interest in anything. It is the attitude which belongs to a *live* proposition, accepted as a practical plan of action. Religious faith is differentiated from other types of faith simply by the ends or ideals which it seeks.

Faith in ideals which are felt to be the highest, the most valuable, and the most essential, is religious faith. Religious faith is therefore only another term for the religious consciousness itself, since that consciousness is purposive and dynamic, and centers in supreme ideal values.

From this point of view several specific problems concerning faith may be settled. The beginning of religious faith is the point at which religious ideals become warm and attractive. The psychological process by which they attain this warmth and attractiveness is that of the association of ideas. The ideas are brought to attention by suggestion, inquiry, education, or in some chance way. By recurring to the attention, by gathering associations sometimes unconsciously, these ideals finally move over into the focus of attention and interest. There they become the object of effort and influence conduct. This beginning of interest, of enthusiastic devotion to ideals, is described in religious biographies as the attainment of faith. It is often attended by keenest satisfaction and by a sense of calm and peace, together with the active attitude. There is likely to be a very pronounced emotional quality in such an experience. This has led some writers to consider faith as peculiarly an emotion. Professor Leuba takes this view: "The core of the faith-state is a particular attitude and an increased efficiency of the will in consequence of which an ideal of life becomes realizable. It is a constructive response to a need; a specific emotion of the sthenic type, subserving, as emotions do, a particular end."[10] But if faith is rightly held to be equivalent to confident purposive activity, then it may include also the intermediate stage of reflective analysis, reasoning, and scientific experiment, within which the best means of attaining the ideal are selected. During this process the faith attitude is not absent. It gives zest, support, and

[10] "Faith," *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 73.

even patience in the quest for knowledge, for although the scientific inquiry might at first seem to arrest and thwart the attainment of the ideal end, experience teaches that science facilitates the realization of practical ideals. Professor Leuba refers to faith-beliefs as propositions which are often accepted by the religious convert without rational examination, and held by him in a quite non-rational way. That is undoubtedly true in many cases, especially where religion has become conventionalized into dogma. But if religious faith attaches, as it may, to propositions which are socially significant and scientifically verifiable, it is possible for that faith to become the incentive and support of the most elaborate scientific investigations and rational control. That is, a rational procedure is normal and, in modern society, increasingly necessary to purposeful or ideal activity. It is as natural and necessary in the ventures of faith, in the sphere of religion, as in the realm of business or statecraft.

There is also at hand, in this functional view, a reconciliation of faith and works. It is because faith has been used erroneously to designate the more intellectual, passive assent to creedal statements that it has seemed possible to divorce it from works. In the proper sense, faith is a vital interest and therefore one which moves on to complete itself in action. There are many difficulties and dangers, however, in the process. Religious education has often emphasized the memorizing and repetition of sentiments without relating them to practice. It has often left its *protégés* stranded in a sea of contemplation. But these phenomena are just as deplorable in religion as in language and literature. Did anyone ever learn the forms of a foreign or a 'dead' language without relating them to useful objects? Did anyone ever become a dreamer and sentimentalist in the realms of literature? Faith is normally dynamic and practical, whether in religion or elsewhere. It is just a convenient term for the propulsive, forward-striving effort of human nature. It

is at its best when, under the control of the highest intelligence, it fulfils, in practical ways, with energy and power the noblest ideals of the race.

Prayer,[11] even more than faith, has been regarded as psychologically peculiar to religion. But it is not. It is in reality a fundamental characteristic of all consciousness, especially of that in which there is a keen sense of personal needs. Prayer, as is abundantly illustrated in primitive religion, is a natural expression of the social character of all consciousness. All thought, unless it be in the case of exceedingly refined and abstract mental processes, is personal and interlocutory. The conscious life of the individual is largely an interplay between the different selves of his different attitudes and habits. These argue, confer, advise, and contend with each other quite as actual people do. These selves may be exalted moral beings with which the lesser selves of one's actual temper and deeds seek communion, and from which they petition aid of every kind. One particular type of self often becomes the standard for the individual, and this self is largely or solely formed upon the model of some definite historical or imaginary character. Where this is true, prayer may attain all the vividness of personal communion, even including hallucinations and visions in which the ideal personality speaks to one or intervenes in one's behalf. It is noticeable that with the increasing rationalization and organization of experience, prayer tends to lose this character of literal, direct appeal to a definitely imagined being. It becomes more and more an aspiration to understand the laws and nature of reality, whether in the large or in detail, and to work in harmony with the forces and tendencies of such reality. On the contemplative, æsthetic side, adoration and reverence are directed to the magnitude, power, progress, and beauty of nature and of society. The two chief factors in prayer

[11] An excellent discussion of prayer is that of Anna Louise Strong: "A Consideration of Prayer from the Standpoint of Social Psychology." The University of Chicago Press, 1908.

are craving and contemplation. Just what expression these shall have, depends upon many factors. The expression changes with the growth of intelligence and with the development of new symbols, but the aspiration and reverence continue to characterize all human consciousness which is sensitive to the ideal values of life.

What is true of prayer is true of other forms of worship. All take their place within the circuit of teleological activity. All express attitudes toward the processes of life, toward individual and social achievements. They express all moods and represent all phases of failure and success, of despair and hope, within the experience of mankind. The symbolic forms of worship are originally the free and natural expression of concrete social experience. They are the art forms in which mankind have registered their spiritual values. Religion, in its creative periods, has ever employed the drama, music, and painting, and in its higher forms, poetry, sculpture, and architecture. No religion has ever been devoid of all these arts, and no religion of civilization has ever been permanently lacking in any of them. These æsthetic forms are also the natural means employed to symbolize the ideals of patriotism, of war, of industry, and of science. In this æsthetic element, then, the religious consciousness is normally at one with other human interests; and here, as in other respects, religion is differentiated by the inclusiveness and ideality of the ends which belong to it.

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.